This paper compares the performance of banks with and without effective government control in appointment of chief operating officers in Korea using panel data. A privatization program succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public. Government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government, decision-making subject to political objectives, and more severe problems of political loan. A model is presented in which political loans are a constraint on banks subject to strong government influence. It is found that banks strongly influenced by government experienced disproportionately bad loan performance and were inefficient compared to privately controlled banks m terms of levels of employment, total costs, and profits.
제1장 서론
제2장 기존문헌 연구
제3장 이론적 모형 분석
제4장 실증분석
제5장 요약 및 결론
참고문헌
ABSTRACT
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