Corporate Governance and Agency Costs : Results of Empirical Analyses-Executive Overview
Corporate Governance and Agency Costs : Results of Empirical Analyses-Executive Overview
- 한국경제연구원
- 한국경제연구원 기타 간행물
- Corporate Governance and Agency Costs
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1998.019 - 32 (24 pages)
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In order to develop normative guidelines, this study examined the antecedents and consequences of agency problems among U S. firms. Our analyses are based on samples of approximately 200 and 400 firms at two different points in time. We find that while board control is a major factor in the incidence of such agency problems, the board is generally more effective at addressing operational versus tactical or strategic control issues Additionally, we find that high levels of control may have a negative effect on other important board roles, such as resource acquisition or strategic decision-making
1. Background : Study Samples and Variables
2. Theoretical Framework for Analyses
3. Study 1 : Board Control and CEO Compensation
4. Study 2 : The Role of The Board in Setting CEO Base Salary and Bonus
5. Study 3 : Board Control and Corporate Social Performance
6. Study 4 : CEO Duality and Firm Performance - A Contingency Model
7. Summary and Recommendations
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