우리나라 은행 자본규제의 유효성

The Effectiveness of Capital Requirement On Korean Commercial Banks

This paper reviews the various theories and empirical evidence of the effectiveness of capital regulations on Korean commercial banks. The effectiveness of capital regulations on banks has been the subject of several careful studies for a long time. There is a body of research that incorporates the option pricing, state preference, mean variance and agency theoretic models. This body of research is theoretical and shows contradictory conclusions about whether the risk-taking behavior of banks is effectively constrained by either private incentives or regulatory requirements. Furthermore, there is virtually no research done on how Korean commercial banks behave with respect to observed changes in capital and risk. Recently, many scholars have tried to find empirical evidence on the impact of the 1988 Basle Accord. It is generally accepted that the adoption of fixed minimum capital requirements led some banks to mamtain higher capital ratios than would otherwise have been the case. This study also investigates the empirical relationship between changes in risk and capital in Korean commercial banks. The results of the study offer evidence on regulatory effectiveness and the role of implict deposit insurance by Korean financial regulatory authorities in influencing bank capital and risk decisions. The quarterly data obtained from commercial banks' balance sheets is used to analyze the relationship between changes in risk and capital over the period from 1990 to 1998. A simultaneous equation estimation, adopting Schrieves and Dahl(l992)'s model, is used to analyze the adjustments to bank capital and risk levels. A pcositive association between changes in risk and capital is found. The existence of such a relationship in Korean commercial banks with capital ratios in excess of regulatory minimum levels suggests that Korean bank managers' private incentives may work to constrain total risk exposure.