In Korea, the Products Liability Law became effective as of July 1, 2002. Under the newly introduced Products Liability Law, Korean manufacturers are now faced with much more uncertainty regarding products liability. This study analyzes theoretically how such changes in legal environments should affect the demand for products liability insurance and what should be the optimal strategy for buying products liability insurance. Results suggest the following. First, it is optimal for insurers to supply partial insurance, considering moral hazard regarding efforts to prevent accidents on the part of the insureds. Second, it is rational for manufacturers to increase insurance coverage as legal environments become more unfavorable to them concerning products liability. Third, manufacturers should cope with a reverse moral hazard by increasing insurance coverage when legal efforts are delegated to products liability insurers. A so-called reverse moral hazard could exist when it is better for insurers not to spend too much legal efforts, while it is always best for manufacturers to win in the legal suits as to products liability.
Ⅰ. 서론
Ⅱ. 연구모형
Ⅲ. 제조물 배상책임보험의 최적계약형태
Ⅳ. 요약 및 결론
참고 문헌
Summary
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