대통령 정책결정구조: 1975-1992년 미국의 대통령 비토를 중심으로

Organizational Determinants of the Presidential Veto

This paper studies the presidential veto of the US because it provides good cases to examine the structure of presidential decision-making process. By studying the process of the presidential veto with Congress, we can examine how dynamic relationships among the major actors, the issue of conflicts, and the power of presidential resources could mold the organizational structure of presidential veto. Based on the theoretical backgrounds, this paper set study hypotheses regarding the organizational resources of OMB(Office of Management and Budget), committee power, presidential popularity, and policy issue category. The analysis shows that in the category of the "government management" policy issue, it showed the highest level of veto probability. When the president threats to veto a bill in the policy area, the Congress does not easily compromise with the presidents as well as presidents do. Regarding the committee variable, it showed lowest probability of presidential veto with the "pork-barrel committees." It suggests the presidents avoid severe conflicts with the congress. With related to the presidential popularity, the study shows positive result, though it shows very low level. In measuring the impacts of the OMB, the study does not show vivid message. Despite some limitations of this study, this study shows that the presidential veto is surely one of the decision-making processes of the executive with structured pattern of influences among actors.