[硏究論文] 이라크戰 以後의 美·北 核葛藤:同伴딜레마의 게임

U.S.Approach to North Korea after the War on Iraq: A Game of Mutual dilema

This paper's major implication is to raise the importance of paying more attention to the different perceptions and strategy of the United States and North Korea. Peculiarity of and differences between strategic mind-sets of the two countries deserve to be observed because the U.S. is the superpower and views North Korea policy as a part of their global non-proliferation strategy, while North Korea, as a secluded and almost failed state, desperately seeks nuclear card as a means of regime survival. However, despite the differences between the U.S. and North Korea in the scope and characteristics of the nuclear issue, crucial interests are at stake for both countries. Problem is that neither the U.S. nor North Korea has a smart strategy to win over its counterpart. Currently, military option is hardly available for the U.S. given the disappointing post-war management process in Iraq, and the negotiation process of the Six-Party Talks is likely to take quite a long time without any promise for successful resolution. For North Korea, another round of 'muddling through' strategy will not be allowed, because the U.S. is determined not to repeat the Geneva Agreement and to dismantle the North Korean nuclear program in a complete and irreversible way. Against this backdrop, forgoing nuclear card in exchange for economic incentives should risk possible breakdown of Pyongyang regime. Microscopic analysis of strategic interests and available options perceived by key policy makers of the U.S. and North Korea will show more accurate prospects of the North Korean nuclear issue, thereby supplement explanatory power of major conventional explanations such as structrualism, neo-liberalism, and negotiation models.