은행간 온라인결제시스템에서의 결제실패에 관한 고찰

A Study on Payment Failure in On-line Settlement System

This research want to discuss payment failure concerning interbank on-line settlement system. This specific research focuses on Fedwire and CHIPS which US have for large-dollar transfer(LVTS). At present LVTS divides into RTGS(Real-Time Gross Settlement) and DNS(Deferred Net Settlement), RTGS requires individual payment, while DNS(bilateral netting, multilateral netting) reduces the number of actual payment; payment is made solely for netted amount of obligations rather than for each one individually. Both RTGS and DNS create payment failure. It results from payment system risks(credit risk, liquidity risk, legal risk, operational and system risk). In order to solve these matters, This research want to suggest as follows; First RTGS may create liquidity shortfalls because of daylight overdraft. Central bank meets this difficulty by allowing a participant to incur it, by providing intraday liquidity to participants in a gross-settlement system. Accordingly It bears the risk of absorbing the loss created by a participant's default. This generates a moral hazard. Second DNS throws financial and other transactions to be settled into uncertainty and thereby undermines financial unstability. Thus settlement repudiation may arise. That may result in insolvency of bank. In order to stop it, I want to propose that the efficiency of netting arrangement will enhance.