지시와 한정사로서의 지시사

Reference and Demonstratives as Definites

Kripke (1972) concentrates on the analysis of proper names that Russell presented, in which names were treated as disguised definite descriptions. His critiques more or less interweave with similar critiques of Donnellan (1972), Geach (1962), and Kaplan (1989). According to Kaplan (1989), the difference between a demonstrative and a definite description is that the two types of NP have distinct modes of reference: Demonstratives, which require an accompanying demonstration in order to be semantically complete have direct reference, picking out the intended referent without the mediation of any sense or descriptive contents. On the present account, demonstratives and definite descriptions are both types of definite NPs, and hence both have presuppositions of familiarity and informational uniqueness. Presupposition is anchored by information in the common ground to an individual in the world which is directly indicated by the speaker at the time of utterance of the demonstrative NP.