후세인의 전쟁 선택요인에 대한 인식론적 고찰 - 1차 걸프전과 사담 후세인의 선택을 중심으로

Cognitive Theory of War: Saddam"s Choice of War in Desert Storm

  The key question to be addressed in this paper explores why Iraq with a slight chance of winning did not avoid war against the U.S. led coalition forces. Even though most war theory does give a few insights about the conditions under which weak states choose war when there is only a slight possibility of winning, explanations based on either emphasis on rationality or ignorance of interacting structure of international relations leave many practical remedies unexplained. This paper explains Iraq"s war choice on the combination of Prospect theory and Game theory. The interacting game structure of asymmetric conflicts can be summarized. Under the threat of massive retaliation by the U.S.-led coalition forces, Iraq was forced to choose between war (defection) and withdrawal (cooperation). In asymmetric conflicts, defection (war against a strong state with a slight chance of winning) is a risky gamble, and cooperation is safe choice. In contrast to Expected Utility theory, this paper implies that a weak state in a loss frame chooses risky war (defection) against a superior adversary in the hope of recovering from their crisis.