학술대회자료
Sequential Reciprocity in Incentive Contacts
Sequential Reciprocity in Incentive Contacts
- 한국산업경영학회
- 한국산업경영학회 발표논문집
- 2003년도 하계 국제학술대회 발표논문집
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2003.0869 - 78 (10 pages)
- 9
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This paper compares a reciprocal agency with a unilateral relationship in sequential reciprocity in incentive contracts. In those relationships, the social surplus of distortion can arise due to different purposes, but each version is equivalent in the loss of social surplus even when each firm is risk-neutral. However, in either contract, there is a positive trade-off between the relative risk and the incentives in the first period but not in the second period. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D2, D82, J3
Abstract<BR>1. Introduction<BR>2. Description of the Model<BR>3. Analysis<BR>4. Comparative Statics<BR>5. Concluding Remarks<BR>References<BR>
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