아비달마 교학의 무위법에 대한 小考

A study of unconditioned dhamma in the Abhidhamma philosophy

&nbsp;&nbsp;This study conveys the unconditioned dhamma according to the conception of the Abhidhamma knowledge. We know that the Abhidhamm philosophy has a various way to the investigation of dhamma. This line of thought is problematic in several respects in the Buddhist philosophy after arising of Buddhist sects. For Buddha&quot;s word only regarded as the truth, even though Buddha did not mention the unconditioned dhamma. On the respect of it, the requirement that a diverse skeptical hypothesis has been risen the question by the Buddhist Theras. It would appear that, in principle, they thought skeptical hypothesis about the unconditioned dhamma regarded as a possibility of explanation. To appreciate the unconditioned dhamma over its skeptical question, we need to take into account the contents, as well as the form, of the Buddhist explanations.<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;Firstly Therav?da school posits the unconditioned dhamma as much as same meaning of nirvana assuming that its characters are ultimately true. The reason is that Ther?vadins did not consider the unconditioned dhamma as the empirical reality. Only they are followed the original meaning of early Buddhism concerning of the unconditioned dhamma. Secondly Mah?s??ghika school, otherwise, takes the meaning of unconditioned dhamma to account for the relevant phenomena in some other fashions. They selected the unconditioned dhamma in the field of immaterial idealism or determinism. Therefore by bringing in these abstract explanations, Mah?s??ghikas run the risk of taking on a more elaborate explanatory mechanism than the Therav?dins. At any rate they are treated the unconditioned dhamma in the nine incorporeal categories following the immaterial conception. Thirdly Sarv?stiv?da shcool could just as well argue that the unconditioned dhamma is simpler than Mah?s??ghika&quot;s treatments, on the grounds that the unconditioned dhamma posits only three objects; ?k??a, pratisa?kh y?-nirodha, and apratisa?khy?-nirodha. Moreover, it is far from clear that, all by itself, elucidating fewer entities is a theoretical virtue. And properly, if need to be, Sarv?stiv?dins could be revised the three kinds of unconditioned dhammas to lay down the role of the consequence between be existing and be non-existing. Lastly the Mahi?s?saka school alternatively accepted the unconditioned dhammas blending both theories of Mah?s??ghika and Sarv?stiv?din, Now, as will emerge shortly, I think there is something right about the claims that the Mahi?s?sakas are less coherent and less simple than the theories connected with before two schools. Because they, in a strict sense, are only considered the unconditioned dhamma in the nature of suchness. But if explanatory coherence and simplicity on the view of Mahi?s?saka are treated solely in structural terms, it should not be surprised that the nature of suchness do go through in the meaning of existence. Under this reason I suppose that the notion of suchness is a core idea to lead the Mah?y?na&quot;s conception of voidness caused the expansive explanation of unconditioned dhamma.<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;Another methodological point requires some remarks about unconditioned dhamma to manifest the meaning of its variousness. So I have divided the unconditioned dhamma into two categories, one is the ultimate principle and the other is an immutable law. In this view, theoretical models are not constitutive of an ontology - they are not the categorical contents - but they are, nevertheless, universally accepted as the ultimate truth according to the Buddhist philosophy.<BR>&nbsp;&nbsp;I have so far been stressing the various notions to show the unconditioned dhamma according to the Abhidhamma philosophy. So I may well wish to be arguing that there are some schools, which did not concerning the unconditioned dhamma at all. Mostly the branch school of Therav?da was not built the edifice of the knowledge of the unconditioned dhamma; Dharmmottar?yas, Bhadr?yan?yas, Sa?m