학술저널
Coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
Coalitionally strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings
- 한국계량경제학회
- 계량경제학보
- 計量經濟學報 第18卷 第4號
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2007.1243 - 51 (9 pages)
- 21
In the framework of multiple objects choice (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems) with separable preferences (weak ordering), we characterize a family of voting rules that satisfy coalitional strategy-proofness, which requires that no group of agents can benefit simultaneously by jointly misrepresenting their preferences.
Abstract<BR>1. Introduction<BR>2. Model and basic concepts<BR>3. Results<BR>Acknowledgments<BR>References<BR>
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