학술저널
Correlation on belief and convergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games
Correlation on belief and convergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games
- 한국계량경제학회
- 계량경제학보
- 計量經濟學報 第18卷 第4號
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2007.1252 - 61 (10 pages)
- 43
This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies `a grain of truth" condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.
Abstract<BR>1. Introduction<BR>2. Kalai and Lehrer’s convergence result<BR>3. Failure of convergence: An example<BR>4. A convergence result<BR>5. Concluding remark<BR>Acknowledgments<BR>References<BR>
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