The Limit of Power in Exercising Aggressive Unilateralism - The Case of the U.S. Section 301 Trade Policy

The Limit of Power in Exercising Aggressive Unilateralism

  While the initiations of Section 301againt trading partners become rare cases, the U.S. still holds its recourse to power for settling trade conflicts. This study attempts estimate the role of power during the transitory period between the final stage of the Uruguay Round and the inauguration of the World Trade Organization. While many targets had been forced to concede to the US demands, the level of concessions was not large enough to be satisfactory for the U.S. Despite explicit reliance upon power, in many cases, trade barriers continue. When the economic power of targeted states becomes larger, the chance of reaching concessive agreements becomes rarer. The gamut of trade policy changes by force has a clear limit. A successful linkage of the current trade issue with other political issues can boost the gains for the US. When the formation of a free trade regime has been forced to reluctant actors, the free trade regime can be fragile without the coercion of a hegemonic state.