학술대회자료
Bidding Rings in Privatization
- 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
- 한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집
- 2006년도 추계학술대회 논문집
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2006.101 - 24 (24 pages)
- 5
커버이미지 없음
This paper studies privatization problems, in which a social planner sells an indivisible object to one of the agents with private valuations (types), and explains the coexistence of auctions and consortia in practice with cooperative incentive in collusive bidding behaviors. By using the theory of optimal mechanism design with dominant strategy equilibria, we show the universal existence of bidding rings (entities that exercise collusive bidding in practice) without any restriction of independent types as in the literature of collusive bidding.
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Model and Preliminaries
3. Optimal Mechanism Approach
4. Discussions
References
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