This article aims to investigate in what points Habermas and Foucault agree and where they diverge about Enlightenment, trying to construct what the abortive meeting in 1984 would have been like, if it had been held. I examine especially their three writings about Enlightenment and modernity around the abortive meeting, that is, "What is Enlightenment?" "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present" and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Habermas and Foucault agree that, first, modernity begins with Kant; secondly, its essence is critical attitude toward the present--critical reason. It could be said that, although Habermas agrees with Foucault's criticism on the dark aspect of Enlightenment, he simultaneously criticizes the traps of Foucault's archaeological and genealogical methodology and his addiction to the power relation. Whereas Habermas admits ardently the achievements and distortions of Enlightenment, Foucault is niggardly in accepting the achievements of Enlightenment. It is also evident that Foucault and Habermas agree that Enlightenment is an "unfinished project." Foucault reevaluates the critical attitude of Enlightenment and agrees with "incomplete project of Enlightenment" in "What is Enlightenment?". However, their divergence is evident in the scope of their solution to the problems of Enlightenment. Foucault never accepts the universal solution of the problems and stresses the partial transformation while Habermas emphasizes communicative action based on intersubjectivity, which implies the solution on the level of society. Foucault's philosophical attitude toward universality is also contrasted with Habermas's. Foucault indicates that universality must be replaced by contingency and arbitrariness while Habermas insists on the validity or a universal solution. The most conspicuous in their divergences is that they have different philosophies about the relation between the subject and society. For Habermas, the subject finds his identity in the context of intersubjectivity through communicative action, but Foucault's concept of the subject never goes beyond the level of the subject itself.
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