While suggesting a new perspective on the South Korean Army's early collapse during the first stage of the Korean War, this paper examines the troubled relations between KMAG and the South Korean military leaders, which helps highlight the other deficiencies plaguing the South Korea Army and eventually leading to its rapid collapse According to the newly avalilable materials, the South Korean Army, in the period of formation and early growth, suffered from hasty and excessive expansion, serious factionalism, politicizathin of the officer corps, and communist infiltration into its ranks More importantly, frequent and acute conflicts emerged in the relations between American military advisors and Korean officers as they struggled to create a South Korean armed force These problems weakened the South Korean Army and enfeebled its response to the sudden attack of the North Korea This paper challenges the dominant interpretation based mainly on the "superpower perspectives" which had prevailed during the Cold War period Although US policy failures in South Korea and North Korea's readiness to attack based on Soviet support are still critinal in understanding this topic, it suggests a new dimension to a now familiar story The early collapse of the South Korean Army originated not only from the failures of national policy of both the United States and South Korea, but also from the failures at lower levels, particularly the militaty advisor-advisee relationship between KMAG and the South Korean Army This paper also traces the process of trail and errors in the South Korean Army's acceptance of American military culture Although more successful relationships emerged after the Korean War started, the early experiences of trial and errors became the pivotal background of the full-scale South Korean military expansion program during the Korean War period
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