This article describes a historical increase since the late 20th century in unorthodox lawmaking in the U.S. legislative process, and interprets is as a sign of intensified partisan competitions between Democratic and Republican members of Congress. Unorthodox lawmaking, exceptionally rare in the previous 'Textbook Congress' predominated by strong standing committees, involves such procedural measures as multiple referral of bills, bypassing the committee with jurisdiction, post-committee adjustment, applying restrictive rules during floor deliberation, resorting to filibusters and cloture votes, devising omnibus bills, and bill readjustment in legislative-executive "summit" meetings. The rapid rise of unorthodox lawmaking clearly encroaches on a hegemonic power of committees as the centers of lawmaking, and signifies complex dynamics of intense party politics as a crucial driving force for legislative process. Party leaders of both majority and minority sides, it is speculated, might have found unorthodox procedural practices politically convenient in pursing their respective legislative agenda. Unorthodox lawmaking, in this sense, is a strategic outcome of party competition, and party collusion to a degree, between majority and minority parties. The relative success of unorthodox procedural measures in producing legislations highlights a positive contribution that unorthodox lawmaking may bring to American legislative politics.
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