관료적 비효율의 원인과 통제 방안

The Sources and Control of Bureaucratic Inefficiency-with reference to inefficiency in government expendtures

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the sources of bureaucratic ineffi-ciency and some institutional devices to control them There have been several views about the goal of bureaucratic behavior neutral producer of public goods, coordinator for socio-economic conflicts, and utility maximizer to seek his own self-interest Although the first two approaches are partly correct in explaining the goal of bureaucratic behavior, the last one is the most realistic among the views Utility-maximizing bureaucrats tend to expand budget size beyond the level of social optimum in producing public goods, which leads to allocative and technical inefficiency The bureaucratic inefficiency might drive from the asymmetric in-formation about the cost of public goods between bureau and Congress, agenda control by bureaucrats with expert knowledge in producing public goods, and un-necessary regulation to private sector, etc This paper suggests three institution al devices to control bureaucratic inefficiency First, ex post control devices con-sist of severe penalty on bureau's bias, fringe benefits for bureau's good per-formance, and effective demand for public good by competitive system for job positions and scarce budget in bureaucratic society, etc However, these two devices cost society to control bureaucratic inefficiency and would not be sustained without continuous monitoring This paper suggests building a society in which trust is the most important factor in all kinds of trade Social networks based on trust provide right incentive for efficiency to bureaucrats, and induce quasi-voluntary compliance from the citizen Also, the accumulation of trust in society will reduce bureaucratic inefficiency, so that leads to increased social welfare