정부지출 구조와 부패

The Composition of Government Expenditure and Corruption

본 논문은 분야별 재정지출 구조 및 상대적 크기의 결정요인을 분석하였다. 이론적 측면에서 분야별 재정지출 구조를 내생화하는 정치경제학적 모형을 구축하였다. 실증분석에서 OECD 국가들의 자료로부터 부패한 국가일수록 경제분야 정부지출/복지 분야 정부지출의 비중 혹은 경제 분야 정부지출/복지 및 교육 분야 정부지출의 비중이 크다는 것을 발견했다. 이는 정치적 부패가 공공투자 비중을 증대시키는 경향이 있다는 Tanzi and Davoodi(1997)나 정치적 부패가 교육 및 보건 예산을 과소 책정하는 경향이 있다는 Mauro(l998)의 연구 결과보다 부패가 정부지출 구성에 광범하게 영향을 미칠 가능성을 시사한다.

This paper analyzes a relationship between the composition of govenment expenditure and corruption. Corruption is found to raise the ratio of government expenditure on economic affairs over government expenditure on health and social protection or education, while per capita CDP is found to lower the ratio of govenment expenditure on economic affairs over expenditure on health and social protection or education. To address the issue of endogeneity of the composition of govenment expenditure, I construct a political model in which the share of govenment expenditure is determined by the rent-seeking politician and the lobbying firms simultaneously. The empirical results imply that corruption affects the composition of government expenditure, through two types of govenment expenditure. It tends to raise the budget share of government expenditure on economic affairs, lowering expenditure on health and social protection or education. It implies the effets of corruption on the composition of government expenditure is much stronger than the effects of corruption on government expenditure, identified by Tanzi and Davoodi(1998) who insist that corruption tends to increase the public investment or Mauro(1998) who shows corruption tends to lower the expenditure on education.