이론에 대비되는 개념으로서의 '실제'에 대한 비판적 논의

A Critical Examination on the Dualistic Conception of 'practice'

본 논문은 교육에서 흔히 실제 혹은 실천의 개념을 이론에 대비되는 것으로 이해하는 이원론을 사회적 실제의 관점에서 옳지 않다는 것을 밝히기 위한 시도이다. 이러한 목적을 위해 '이론'과 반대되고 분리되는 개념으로서의 '실제'혹은 '실천'이 적합하지 않다는 것을 그리스 맥락에서의 프락시스, 라일과 비트겐쉬타인과 같은 현대 철학자들의 실제에 관한 논의, 그리고 교육적 관점에서의 이론과 실천간의 역동성에 비추어 논의했다.

The conception of 'practice' is often understood as 'everything that is not 'theory'' without any doubt. Is this conventional usage of 'practice' correct? This paper tries to show that the conventional usage of 'practice' is not appropriate in terms of the Greek notion of 'praxis'. Ryle's 'knowing how' and Wittgenstein's 'language-games', and is also not appropriate from an educational point of view. My min arguments for this can be summarised as follows. First of all, a conventional usage of 'practice' is mistaken in the light of the Greek notion of praxis. The notion of praxis makes sense in relation to poiesis('making' or 'producing') rather than theoria('theory'). Two ways of live, I.e. theoretical life and practical life also should he understood as a way of two different forms of socially embedded human activities rather than a dualistic distinction. Secondly, for Ryle and Wittgenstein, all human activities, whether 'knowing that' or 'knowing how', or 'language-games', are basically regarded as 'practices'. For Ryle, 'knowing how' is logically prior to 'knowing that' and thus practice is not a step-child of theory, but rather theory cannot be fully understood without participating in practices to which someone belongs. For Wittgenstein, language-games are fundamentally social practices that relate to bringing about some actions and doings through engaging in the activity rather than simply linguistic utterances or statements. Lastly, from the educational perspective, the strict dichotomy between theory and practice may not plausible in that it tends to overlook the nature of educational practices and the role of practitioners who engage in them and, further, the dynamics among practitioners, practice and theory. Given these grounds, I would suggest that the conception of practice can be fully, and adequately, understood in terms of social practices in which people engage.