학술저널
Informational Disadvantage and Bargaining Power
Informational Disadvantage and Bargaining Power
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.20 No.1
-
2009.039 - 19 (11 pages)
- 13
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We consider an alternating offer model where the size of the to-tal surplus is stochastic. Furthermore, the size changes during the time when the offer is being considered. As a result the responder may obtain more information than the proposer. We analyze how the asymmetry in ability to access good information affects the bargaining power, both in terms of the resulting share and in terms of the delay in agreement.
1 Introduction
2 Model I: Selling Game
3 Preliminary Results
4 Equilibrium
5 Model II: Buying Game
6 Further Research
References
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