학술저널
Product Announcement and Reputation in a Cheap Talk Game
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.21 No.4
-
2010.1259 - 78 (20 pages)
- 44
커버이미지 없음
Firms keep introducing new products in markets. In making a buy-or-wait decision, consumers rely on information provided by firms. In a cheap-talk game model (i.e., Crawford and Sobel (1982)), we identify a simple informative equilibrium, in which firms make a discrete announcement, either low or high quality, even though product quality space is continuous. We characterize the equilibrium properties and evaluate its welfare effects.
1. Introduction
2. Model
3. Analysis
4. Conclusion
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