상세검색
최근 검색어 전체 삭제
다국어입력
즐겨찾기0
학술저널

헌정제도로서의 '국무총리'

'Premier Minister' in our Constitutional System : Tracing its Historical Oscillation between Presidentialism and Parliamentarism

  • 311
107195.jpg

In August 2009, the Parliamentary Advisory Committee of Constitutional Revision proposed adopting a French style dual executive system. The proposed constitutional design strengthens the position/powers of the prime minister, while weakening the position/powers of the president. This paper traces the historical changes and continuities of the position/powers of the prime minister in the texts of the Korean constitutions, since the Provisional Constitution of 1919. Here, the powers of the president, both legislative and non-legislative, are also examined. To assess the strength of the position/powers of the prime minister, I use the Shugart and Carey's scoring methods for measuring the powers of the presidency, with some modifications to suit the purpose of this paper. The results show some macro-historical tendencies in the Korean constitutionalism. 1. The non-legislative, government-forming powers of the president show a wider range of fluctuations than the legislative powers of the president. 2. The position/powers of the prime minister fluctuate more widely in relation to the president than in relation to the parliament. 3. The position/powers of the prime minister in relation to the president and the general position/powers of the prime minister fluctuate along a similar path. In the conclusion, I point out some problems of the proposed constitutional design. First, the position/powers of the prime minister are not so strong as intended, especially in relation to the parliament. The "constructive" vote of no-confidence is not enough to be "constructive", for the braking lever of parliamentary dissolution, available only for the second half, is not in the hand of cabinet, but in the hand of president. Second, the position/powers of the president are not so weak as intended, for the directly elected president can use some "blocking powers" such as referendum and parliamentary dissolution.

Ⅰ. 들어가는 말

Ⅱ. 통합과 경쟁의 쌍곡선 : 임시정부 시기 '제2인자'의 헌법상 지위

Ⅲ. 1948년의 선택 : 내각제적 총리와 대통령제적 대통령의 불협화음

Ⅳ. 격동과 좌절의 시대 : 내각제로의 전환과 대통령제로의 회귀

Ⅴ. 민주헌정의 수난과 회복 : 타락한 대통령제의 구원을 향하여

Ⅵ. 분석결과의 정리와 헌법연구자문위원회 제1안의 비판적 재검토

(0)

(0)

로딩중