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학술저널

地方政府間의 租稅競爭

Tax Competition among Local Governments

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This paper investigates whether or not local governments competing formobile capital interact strategically with their tax rates, and if so, how they react to each other. Using the Boston SMSA data, this empirical study indicates weak evidence that a jurisdiction responds by decreasing their tax rates when its competing jurisdictions increase their tax rates.

Ⅰ. 序論

Ⅱ. 租稅競爭의 模型

Ⅲ. 租稅競爭에 대한 實證分析

Ⅳ. 結言

參考文獻

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