地域間 租稅競爭과 中央政府

Regional Coordination and Central Government Intervention in a Regional Tax Competition

This paper examines the justification of central government intervention in a model of regional tax competition with the consideration of the possibility of regional coordination. We use a model of tax competition between two heterogeneous regions, which differ in their endowment of two production factors. We answer to the question that whether an individual region desires the central government intervention or not, even though the intervention is socially desirable. Using a specific type of utility function under which the equilibrium resulted from regional coordination is efficient, we identify the set of endowment allocations that determine regions’ preferences among the three tax regimes: the Nash non-cooperative regime, the coordinative regime, and the central government regime. Using the result, we identify the endowment allocation set under which the central government intervention is desired by an individual region. We find that the central government intervention is desired by an individual region if the region’s utility level resulted form Nash tax competition is lower than the Pareto efficient level and the regions are not able to achieve an Pareto improvement by them-selves.