캐나다 財政의 分權化(地方化)에 관한 硏究

A Study on Fiscal Decentralization in Canada

This paper is concerned with a historical evaluation of the principles and practice of federal-provincial fiscal relations in Canada as reflected in the distribution of fiscal power (i.e., the taxing power and the spending power) between levels of government and in the system of transfers. The difficulties of achieving a balance between expenditure responsibilities and revenue sources and problems arising from differences in the relative fiscal capacities of the provinces have frequently placed strains on Canadian Confederation. Solutions to these problems for the most part have been the product of evolution and negotiation. Before 1940, each level of government sought additional tax sources as revenue needs increased, with frequent overlapping and complication in tax administration. The tax agreements which began in 1941, simplified tax administration, reduced the possibility of tax inequities that could arise from joint occupancy of tax fields, established a degree of uniformity in certain taxes, and introduced a degree of tax harmony between the federal government and provincial governments. This was certainly true of the tax rental and tax-sharing agreements of 1941 to 1962. Subsequent tax agreements saw the federal government granting an increasing amount of tax room to the provinces to enable them to increase their taxes without placing excessive burdens on their taxpayers. At the same time, greater use was made of specific-purpose transfers to assist the provinces to meet their financial obligations until, in 1977, such transfers for major shared-cost programs were replaced by a combination of tax and cash transfers under the EPF arrangement. EPF cash transfers were escalated until the late 1980s when the federal government sought to place a freeze on these transfers. In a federation, the federal Parliament should have a virtually unlimited taxing power and it should be used not only to raise revenue for ventures falling squarely within federal legislative powers but also as an economic instrument. It is also imperative that provincial and local governments should have broad taxing power. The proposal for the abolition of the federal spending power, except as an adjunct to federal legislative powers or to deal with such matters as equalization, may raise serious difficulties. It would be wiser to devise methods for harnessing the spending power in such a way as to maintain national leadership in the federal government, while ensuring provincial predominance in matters closely touching the particular character of provincial society.