自治團體間 環境補助金 決定모델 硏究

A Study on the Subsidy between Local Governments in Environmental Problems: A Categorical Equalization Model with Coase Theorem

The purpose of this paper is to find a model that can solve the conflicts related to water pollution among local governments. The main interest of local government in water supply is clean water flowing into river. The downstream local governments are keen in the polluting activity of upstream governments. In general, they attempt to regulate any productive activity of the upstream governments regardless to actual pollution. On the other hand, the upstream government resist to the downstream governments because it might be fatal to the regional economy. In the local autonomy system, these kinds of conflicts are expected to increase and remain unsolved if the present environmental policies continue. The solution of the conflicts in this paper is based on categorical equity in budgeting water management account among the related local governments. The basic principle of this model is that the budget of each government related to water management should be adjusted to be balanced by negative or positive subsidies based on Coase Theorem. That is, downstream governments subsidize upstream governments directly under the condition that upstream governments satisfy the required quality of water flowing into river. According to tentative calculations of the subsidies for Han River, the subsidies calculated at the model are quite reasonable levels, considering financial ability of each government. If conflicts are settled successfully, downstream governments use the subsidies to satisfy the required water quality at their region for themselves as well as for upstream government. It gives incentives upstream governments to internalize polluting activity in their regions.