消費外部效果를 고려한 所得移轉模型과 所得分配

Taxation and Transfers for Regulating Consumption Externalities

This paper has dealt with government interventions by taxation and transfers in an economy of which individuals’ utility functions are interdependent by consumption externalities. An individual’s utility is influenced by other’s consumption behaviour when the consumption externalities have taken place. The paper has highlight a case of which the rich’s (or the poor’s) consumption augmentation bring on reducing the poor’s (or the rich’s) utilities, that is, the rich and the poor are reciprocally malevolent. Optimal taxation and transfers on the standpoint of impartial government have been studied by setting up such case. Also, the most desirable scheme for reducing income inequality and increasing economic efficiency, has been explored through the comparative static analysis. As the result, the program for enhancing the poor’s marginal productivities has been proved as the most effective to minimize malcontentment of the both classes (minimal fiscal extortion from the reluctant rich and maximal compensation for the poor), improve income distribution and sustain economic efficiency under the malevolent situation between the rich and the poor.