適正稅務調査制度

An Optimal Tax Audit Mechanism : Models, and Evidences from a Tax Payment Function

Sicne tax evasion, a moral hazard rooted in information asymmetry, causes inefficiency as well as distorting income deistribution, conscious policies are needed to abate its harm. Focusing on the self-employed. we explore ’Family Income and Expenditure Survey., We also examine: (1) tax payment factors (2) the income tax gap between self-employed(SELF) households(HHs) and ‘pay-as-you-earn’(PAYE) employee HHs: and (3) the effect of the tax audit rule on compliance. Though it saves audit resoures and seizes evaders’ risk premium. a cutoff audit- currently adopted in korea featuring “reporting guidelines” is shown to lower social welfare due to its built - in regressive bias. The line drawing hinders self-compliance as well. An endogenous audit with the audit chance declining in reported income without truncation is desirable for Inequality-averse society. At least. the cutoff must be kept secret to taxpayers. The empirical analysis shows: (1) One-third of SELF HHs are outside tax enforcement: (2) SELF HHs Pay less income tax than PAYE HHs by 46% to 60%, ceteris paribus. The tax gap widens with income: (3) The elasticity with income tax payment to income is less than one for SELF HHs. conflicting with progressive tax shedule : (4) SELF HHs’ elasticity is lower around their mean income than at tails’ which reflects the adverse of the cutoff audit: and (5) Tax enforcement is ineffective to capital income.