지방공공재의 분권적 공급과 경제적 효율성에 관한 이론적 고찰

Economic Efficiency, and Decentralized Provision of a Local Public Good under Stackelberg Fiscal Interactions

This paper in vestigates whether strategically competing municipalities can ensure efficient provision of local public goods when they behave as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower. After providing the implications of equilibrium under the assumption of free mobility of consumers and a Stackelberg structure, this paper shows that municipalities acting as either a Stackelberg leader or a follower may over-provide or under-provide local public goods, that is, the efficiency in the provision of public goods is not guaranteed. A theory for testing the Tiebout hypothesis has been developed from the decision rules for both a leading and following municipalities. Efficiency would be obtained only if property value is invariant to the level of public service.