학술저널
Correlation on belief and convergence to Nash equilibrium in repeated games
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.18 No.4
-
2007.1252 - 61 (10 pages)
- 8
This paper presents an example in which players never learn to play Nash equilibrium in the repeated games when one believes that others are correlating their strategies, though his belief satisfies ‘a grain of truth’ condition. A sufficient condition on the learning procedure to restore the convergence is suggested and turns out to be quite demanding.
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Kalai and Lehrer’s convergence result
3. Failure of convergence: An example
4. A convergence result
5. Concludingremark
Acknowledgments
References
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