외환경제위기를 전후한 상위 거대 재벌의 재무적 변화 연구

An Analysis of the Financial Behaviors of Korean Top Biggest Chaebols around Korean Economic Crisis in 1997-1998

This paper analyses the financial behaviors of Korean top biggest Chaebols around Korean economic crisis in 1997-1998. The analysis is done by using financial data of each biggest Chaebol and summed data of all affiliated firms of each Chaebol. The most characteristical feature in corporate capital structure is that corporate financial leverage is very proportional to the size of firms during the period of rapid economic growth. The rationing regime of bank credit led by Korean government mainly shaped the feature. In the first half of 1990s, the government policy for Chaebols turned from economic growth led by Chaebols to regulation to Chaebols’ inflation. As the government made the limit of bank credit to Chaebols, their financial leverage was depressed down. Chaebols tried to escape from the regulations and made active fixed investments by menas of borrowing just before the economic crisis of 1997-1998. As a result, their financial leverage went up and it caused the crisis. After the crisis, Korean government directly set the upper limit of financial leverage of biggest Chaebols. They were forced to make M&As and make the debt/equity ratio down under 200%. They had to expand their capitals rapidly in short term and managed to do it partially through mutual shareholdings among affiliated firms. The composition of equity capitals of top biggest Chaebols was analysed using their first consolidated financial data.