학술저널
Evolutionary Stability in Games with Continuous Strategy Space
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.23 No.1
-
2012.0363 - 78 (16 pages)
- 51
The classical evolutionary game theory, pioneered by Maynard Smith and Price (1973), was initially developed in the context of uni-population games with discrete strategy space. Recently some progress has been made in extending the original idea of Maynard Smith and his collaborators into uni-population games with continuous strategy space (Apaloo, 1997; Christiansen, 1991; Cressman, 2006; Eshel, 1983). The current paper reviews them in a unifying framework, and provides some new theorems linking various concepts of evolutionary stability proposed by different authors.
Abstract
1. INTRODUCTION
2. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITIES IN GAMES WITH CONTINUOUS STRATEGY SPACES
3. EXAMPLES
4. CONCLUSION
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