수입국의 관세부과, 생산량-가격 경쟁과 사회후생의 비교정학

Cournot versus Bertrand Competition in an Importing Country with Tariff Policy and Social Welfare

This paper shows the effect of tariff policy when foreign firms compete with each other in the importing country under either price or quantity competition. Thus, we find that (i) welfare of the importing country is higher in the tariff regime than in no tariff regime regardless of the type of market competition, (ii) if tariffs are imposed on the foreign firms welfare of the importing country is higher under price competition than under quantity competition, (iii) if the degree of imperfect substitutability is sufficiently high, the profits of the foreign firms are higher under price competition than under quantity competition and vice versa Moreover, regardless of the degree of imperfect complementarity, the profits of the foreign firms are always higher under price competition than under quantity competition. However, even though the profits of the foreign firms depend on the degree of imperfect substitutability, the total output of the foreign firms is always higher under price competition than under quantity competition. This result implies that the tariff policy affects the strategy of the foreign firms. This paper can be useful for the development of educational materials and teaching methods effective and efficient for trade learners.