유연조정교섭 메커니즘에 관한 연구

A New Approach for Evaluating Industrial Unionism and Collective Bargaining: Flexible and Coordinated Mechanism in Korea's De-Associated Health and Medical Industry

본 연구는 단체교섭 구조를 집권화-분권화 측면에서만 분석하는 기존의 접근방식과 달리 유연-경직 측면과 조정-비조정 측면에서 동시에 분석하는 접근방식이 한국의 교섭구조 변화를 보다 잘 설명할 수 있다고 주장한다. 본 연구는 문헌연구와 사례연구라는 두 가지 연구전략을 채택하였다. 최근 선진국의 교섭구조 변화에 대한 문헌을 세밀히 검토하면, 유연/경직 교섭 측면과 조정/비조정 교섭 측면이 동시에 고려되어야 교섭구조 변화가 제대로 이해된다는 점을 알 수 있다. 다음으로 사용자단체 해산 다음 해인 지난 2010년 보건의료 교섭 사례를 다루면서, 유연하고 조정된 교섭이 이루어지는 과정과 작동원리, 그리고 그 성과 등을 살펴보았다. 사용자단체가 해산되었음에도 기업별 교섭으로 전환되지 않은 이유는 개별 사업장의 노사의 힘으로는 주어진 현안을 해결할 수 없다는 점, 즉 초기업 수준의 노사간 상호의존성 때문이라고 판단된다. 상호의존성은 노사로 하여금 공공재를 형성하며(조정된 교섭), 이는 다시 개별사업장의 상황이 교섭에 반영될 수 있는 여지를 확대하게 한다(유연한 교섭). 본 연구 결과 환경이나 제도적 요건이 교섭구조를 결정짓는 것이 아니며, 보건의료 노사는 유연하고 조정된 교섭을 실행하기 위해 다양한 전략적 선택을 취하는 것으로 나타났다. 즉, 환경(구조)결정론자들의 주장과는 달리 행위 주체자의 능동적인 대응과 전략적 선택이 교섭구조를 형성하는 주요 요인으로 작용한다. 본 연구를 통해 드러난 보건의료산업에서의 유연조정 교섭이 한국의 타 산별교섭에도 확인될 수 있을 것인지 추가적인 연구가 필요하다. 사례연구와 비교연구를 통해 한국에서 유연하고 조정된 교섭이 이루어지는 메카니즘을 보다 체계화하기를 기대한다. 만약 새로운 접근방식이 한국의 교섭구조 변화를 보다 풍부하고 정확하게 해석할 수 있는데 성공한다면, 이는 해외 선진국의 교섭구조 변화를 분석할 수 있는 새로운 모델로 제시될 수 있을 것이다.

This paper analyzes the particular case of de-associated industrial collective bargaining that occurred in 2010 in Korea's health and medical industry subsequent to the dissolution of the employers association. The paper argues for a new framework for understanding industrial unionism. The new approach considers industrial unionism, especially industrial bargaining, in terms of flexibility/ rigidity and coordination/incoordination and finds ample evidence of flexibility and coordination at work. The findings are at odds with the existing papers that explain industrial bargaining in terms of centralization/decentralization. Most of the research on the health and medical industry in particular follows a structural/deterministic approach, concluding that Korean unions and employers are not able to build industrial unionism due to the lack of institutional and organizational conditions - such as external labor markets and high unionization rates. Furthermore, most research ignores the possibility that industrial unionism sustains in the absence of an employers association who negotiates with an industrial union and signs an industrial collective agreement. The case under study provides ample evidence to the contrary. In 2009, employers in the health and medical industry dissolved their association, causing a pause in the industrial bargaining process, which resulted in the failure to reach a collective agreement that year. This sudden dissolution and disruption seemed to support the structural/deterministic argument that the lack of institutional and organizational conditions conductive to industrial unionism in Korea has led industrial unionism instability. In the case of the health and medical industry, most industrial relations researchers expected the immediate reversion to enterprise bargaining, after the association's dissolution, which would signal the end of industrial unionism in the field. The reality, however, was quite different. Contrary to expectations, 2010 saw effective flexible and coordinated bargaining arrangements in the health and medical industry, despite the absence of an employers association, rather than a return to decentralized bargaining between individual employers and enterprise unions. The health and medical industrial union leaders and local union representatives set up joint bargaining teams, and discussed wages and working conditions with employers. A joint team negotiated with individual counterparts, or with multi-employers representatives. Both cases produced a quite similar collective agreements for two main reasons. First, pattern setters provided a reference upon which other joint teams made their contracts with individual employers. Second, multi-employer representatives made an agreement with a groups of joint teams over a certain issues. These two types of bargaining agreements were achieved through non-centralized bargaining, accommodating the particular situations of each hospital while addressing common issues concerning the industry at large. Given this case evidence, it appears that a new framework for understanding industrial unionism and collective bargaining is called for, beyond the simple structural/deterministic and centralized/ decentralized approach. The authors propose a framework that examines flexibility/ rigidity and coordination/incoordination in the bargaining mechanism. In the case under examination, unions and employers considered each hospitals' situation in the bargaining, demonstrating flexibility, which means a flexible bargaining. Also, unions and employers made collective agreements reducing the differences among their members as well as inducing collective goods, which means a coordinate bargaining. The case clearly shows that institutional and organizational conditions are not dominant factors in constructing a flexible and coordinated bargaining. While permitting a local union to negotiate with individual employers, the industrial union initiat