학술저널
Nash Implementation under Allocative Constraints
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- 경제논집
- 경제논집 51권 2호
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2012.12367 - 377 (10 pages)
- 11
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In exchange economies, we investigate social choice rules that can be implemented in Nash equilibrium under some allocative constraints. Allocative constraints can represent standard normative requirements such as efficiency and fairness and are formulated by a fixed set of allocations from which outcome functions (of game forms) can take values. We show that an extended notion of Maskin's monotonicity[Maskin(1977, 1999)] is a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash implementation under allocative constraints.
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Exchange Economies
3. Results
References
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