Evidentiary Uncertainty and Negligence Rules
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 19 No.4
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2006.12439 - 466 (27 pages)
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This paper analyzes the effects of evidentiary uncertainty on people's incentives to abide by rules in the context of negligence rules in tort law. It demonstrates that i) the comparative negligence rule is not necessarily superior to the simple or the contributory negligence rule, ii) an application of lenient standards of due care under the contributory negligence rule than in comparative negligence rule would not necessarily restore social efficiency, and iii) a partial reduction of legal uncertainty would not necessarily improve social efficiency. These results contrast previous theoretical literature.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Properties of Equilibrium
Ⅳ. Graphical Illustration
Ⅴ. Comparison with Earlier Literature
Ⅵ. Conclusion
Appendix
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