학술저널
Folk Theorems in the Negotiation Game with Transaction Costs
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 23 No.3
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2010.09407 - 419 (12 pages)
- 3
커버이미지 없음
Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria and inefficiencies in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen 1995) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are transaction costs (Anderlini and Felli 2001). This paper considers a model of negotiation with transaction costs. It is shown that, in contrast to the aforementioned analyses, full Folk theorems are obtained in our model.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Negotiation Game
Ⅲ. Costly Negotiation
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