학술저널
Noisy and Subjective Performance Measure in Promotion Tournaments
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 25 No.2
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2012.06207 - 221 (14 pages)
- 5
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This paper considers both incentive and sorting effects of a promotion tournament, and analyzes the optimal degree of uncertainty in the agents' performance measure. In a subjective promotion tournament where the winner is determined by the principal's belief about the agents' ability, this paper shows that a noisy performance measure can have a positive incentive effect and a negative sorting effect. Therefore, it can be optimal for the principal to intentionally choose a noisy performance measure.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Related Literature
Ⅲ. Model
Ⅳ. Agents' Choice of Effort
Ⅴ. Principal's Optimal Choice of Uncertainty
Ⅵ. Conclusion
Appendix
References
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