학술저널
An Optimal Incentive Tax Policy on Horizontal Mergers
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 26 No.2
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2013.06239 - 254 (15 pages)
- 2
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This paper analyzes an optimal antitrust policy on horizontal mergers under asymmetric information when antitrust agency cannot observe the post-merger private cost of merged firms. By using a discrete mechanism design approach with self-selection, this paper proposes an incentive compatible lump-sum tax scheme to provide an efficient decision on whether the application for merger should be accepted or rejected. Results show that the optimal size of lumpsum tax is not affected by the informational rent of private postmerger cost information of merged firms.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Optimal Merger Policy with Complete Information
Ⅲ. Optimal Merger Policy with Incomplete Information
Ⅳ. Extensions and Discussions
Ⅴ. Conclusion
Appendix
References
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