학술저널
On the Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
- 한국계량경제학회
- JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS
- Vol.25 No.1
-
2014.031 - 12 (11 pages)
- 15
We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total effort or the expected highest effort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive most of the results in Moldovanu and Sela's (2001, American Economic Review, 542-558; 2006, Journal of Economic Theory, 70-96) incomplete-information model of contests in a particularly simple fashion, as well as to obtain new results.
Abstract
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MODEL
3. MAXIMIZATION OF EXPECTED TOTAL EFFORT
4. MAXIMIZATION OF EXPECTED HIGHEST EFFORT
5. CONCLUSION
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