학술저널
The Equivalence of t-wise and Pareto Optimality: A Generalization
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 3 No.3
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1990.09239 - 253 (14 pages)
- 0
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We study the optimality of allocations obtained in an economy in which agents are not coordinated by a single consistent system like Walrasian auctioneer. In order to exploit all the opportunities for mutually beneficial trade, people must find a way to coordinate themselves beyond the limitation set by the incomplete market structure. We will consider economies whose market structure does not necessarily permit a full coordination, and completely characterize the condition which must be satisfied to guarantee a Pareto optimal outcome. Our result generalizes previous equivalence conditions.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. Equivalence Theorem
Ⅳ. Proof of the Theorem
Ⅴ. Comparison with the Goldman-Starr Condition
Ⅵ. Conclusion
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