Bank Runs: Speculative Runs and Fundamental Runs
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 4 No.3
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1991.09199 - 213 (14 pages)
- 0
This paper analyzes deposit contracts when banks face alternative types of bank runs. The bank in our model can prevent speculative types of bank runs, which arise when depositors believe that deposit withdrawal volume will lead the bank into insolvency, by designing contracts that allow for payment suspension. However, suspension does not eliminate fundamental runs which arise when depositors calculate, given new information revealing low returns, that deposit withdrawal dominates deposit retention. The bank can eliminate fundamental runs by restricting payments. Then, deposit claim depreciation depends on expected returns and withdrawal volume prior to restriction.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. A Three Period, Single Good Economy
Ⅲ. Deposit Contracts and Speculative Runs
Ⅳ. Deposit Contracts and Fundamental Runs
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References
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