학술저널
Bargain for Exit
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 6 No.2
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1993.06115 - 125 (10 pages)
- 0
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We examine an alternate move bargaining model of an exit process in a declining industry. We show that when firms negotiate with each other, the less profitable firm will be merged to be closed down. We find that the size of the firm will affect the division of the surplus created by the merger through cost effects. The smaller firm extracts more surplus than its value under continued operation because it has cost advantage.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. The Bargaining Outcome
Ⅳ. Concluding Comments
References
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