학술저널
Equilibrium Inferences from the Choice of Forum: Two-audience Case
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 6 No.3
-
1993.09241 - 255 (14 pages)
- 0
커버이미지 없음
This paper studies a signalling model with two audiences. In which the relationship between the sender and one audience is reverse to that of the sender and the other audience. When the sender chooses a forum after observing his type, the receivers make inferences about the sender's type not only from the message but also from the choice of forum; this influences the equilibrium. We present two models and analyze .the equilibrium, which differ in whether the sender can commit the choice of communication or not.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Model
Ⅲ. Equilibria
Ⅳ. Conclusion
References
(0)
(0)