학술저널
General Analysis of Horizontal Merger
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 7 No.3
-
1994.09279 - 290 (11 pages)
- 3
커버이미지 없음
A new method of proof is presented for the existence of a unique Cournot equilibrium in oligopoly with a merged entity and independent firms. The method is then applied to derive price-enhancing effect of an increase in the number of merged firms. On the basis of the existence proof and stability condition, a sufficient condition is derived for an increase in the number of merged firms to be profitable. This condition is illustrated for a simple case of linear demand and identical quadratic cost functions. Finally, a numerical example is given.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Equilibrium Industry and Merged Entity's Output
Ⅲ. Effects of Number of Merged Firms
Ⅳ. Conclusion
References
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