학술저널
Choosing Roles in a Model of Quality Differentiation
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 9 No.3
-
1996.09191 - 201 (10 pages)
- 0
커버이미지 없음
This paper examines games involving quality differentiation in a sequential duopoly model and points to the leadership solutions. It also deals with the issue of choosing roles (leader or follower) of the firms in quality and price choice game. In this paper, we show that (i) the leadership solutions are the subgame perfect equilibria and simultaneous price competition is in either case of Stackelberg leadership solutions not, and that (ii) the sustaining leadership solution is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium if the diversity of tastes is sufficiently large.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. The Model
Ⅲ. The Analysis
Ⅳ. Some Discussions
Ⅴ. Summarizing Remarks
References
(0)
(0)