학술저널
Note: Does Uncertain Future Hamper Cooperation?
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 9 No.3
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1996.09223 - 228 (5 pages)
- 0
커버이미지 없음
In this paper, a counter example is constructed to show that the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) can not be applied when players have incomplete information about the future stage game. When the future stage game is uncertain, players have ex-post incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy of Fudenberg and Maskin since the ex-ante future punishment is not sufficiently severe.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Motivation
Ⅱ. A Counter Example
Ⅲ. Comments
References
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