학술저널
Preannouncement as a Deterrence in a Model of Safety Regulation
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- Seoul Journal of Economics
- Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 10 No.1
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1997.0341 - 55 (14 pages)
- 0
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We will examine the role of preannouncement (cheap talk) in a model of safety regulation. It is asserted that if the authority can make a preannouncement, it may transmit credible messages and can induce a more socially desirable level of precaution of the potential injurer even if it is unbinding, because the authority and the agent have some interest in common, that is, to deter accidents.
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Basic Model
Ⅲ. Analysis
Ⅳ. Welfare Analysis
Ⅴ. Conclusion
References
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